Water Markets in Europe by Zetland, D.J.
During the summer of 2008, ships carried emergency
supplies of water to Cyprus and Barcelona, Spain. These
expensive deliveries were the result of political decisions
to transfer water to “important” destinations, not arms-
length transactions in a market. European water mar-
kets for bottled water, equipment, and services are high-
ly developed, but the same cannot be said for markets in
water quality or quantity that are well-known in parts of
the United States (U.S.) and Australia, respectively.
Water markets in Europe are underdeveloped because
they are difficult to implement within existing institu-
tional constraints or inefficient from a transaction cost
perspective. This article describes Europe’s nascent
water markets, explores the factors affecting their devel-
opment (or lack thereof), and speculates on where and
how markets may emerge in the future.
EXISTING WATER MARKETS IN EUROPE
Table 1 gives a partial overview of the state of water
markets in Europe. I use “partial” because it is neither an
exhaustive census of all European countries nor author-
itative in characterizing the state of markets in a coun-
try. I may have missed some markets.
Markets in Quantity
Water markets in Spain, according to Garrido (2011),
are similar to water markets in California. Market trades
are allowed but subject to restrictions on movement and
use. The impact of trades on environmental flows are not
always known, but environmental constraints can block
trades. In some cases, water “rights” can be unilaterally
redefined or revoked by the issuing authority. Trades can
be challenged by third parties, restricted to certain buy-
ers, or redirected to the State.
Despite these barriers, water purchases and trades
took place at the height of the last drought (2006-2008).
Most local purchases were directed at limiting ground-
water withdrawals in an area (i.e., the government run-
ning a reverse auction to buy back farmers’ pumping
rights). Annual transbasin sales from farmers to other
farmers and urban interests in drier areas ranged from
68-102 million m3 (55-83 af) at prices that ranged from
0.15 euro to 0.28 euro per m3 ($270 to $500 per af). Gov-
ernment taxes, subsidies, and adjustments changed
these top-line numbers by ±50 percent.
The market for water basically collapsed after the
drought ended in 2008 and water users returned to busi-
ness as usual. Carlos M. Gomez (Universidad de Alcalá)
emailed me this excellent summary:
Garrido (2011) confirms Gomez’s view. He notes that
water markets will not flourish without a political push
to reform Spain’s existing water rights and laws. In the
meantime, water management efficiency will improve as
regulations on water quality and
supplies continue to tighten. Win-
penny et al. (2010), for example, de-
scribe complicated exchanges of
freshwater, desalinated water, and
wastewater among agricultural,
urban, and environmental interests
in Spain. These exchanges do not
take place in an open market.
According to Cave (2009), water
markets in England and Wales have
not developed as hoped. The mar-
ket for “inset services” (where cus-
tomers using more than 50,000 m3
per year can replace the local mo-
nopolist with another seller) is quite
small (18 appointments). The mar-
ket for “common carriage,” where a
wholesaler uses another monopo-
list’s network to deliver water to a
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Table 1. Markets for Water Quality and
Quantity in Selected European Countries.
Country Quantity Quality Comment (*see text)
Baltic Nations Discussed N, P emissions trading
Belgium Potential N, P emissions trading
Bulgaria/Romania Pilots *PES (WWF/Danube)
France Some *Payments for quality
Germany Some *Payments for quality
Italy No legal framework
Netherlands Discussed *Payments for quality
Spain Some Some *Inactive
agricultural
United Kingdom Some M&I Discussed *Services to large customers
Rather than representing a radical institutional
change in the way water rights are defined and allo-
cated, allowing some water trading was mostly part
of a “disaster management strategy.” The official
drought finished in 2008 when abundant rains came
back and washed water markets out from the policy
arena, sending them back to the researchers' desks
where they still are waiting to be properly dissected.
Some leftovers of these markets are still exposed to
the public curiosity. In fact, some agreements to trade
water have survived and not more than one digit num-
ber of transactions took place in 2010 and all of them
consisted in the renewal of some previously signed
contract.
customer, is practically nonexistent (one transaction).
Cave (2009) recommends liberalization towards tradable
permits for abstraction and discharge and a framework
allowing “upstream sources” to add raw or treated water
into incumbent networks.
Markets in Quality
Water emissions trading is not well developed in Eu-
rope, probably due to the “crowding out” influence of the
Water Framework Directive (WFD) and transaction
cost/complexity tradeoffs discussed later. According to
Heinz (2002), farmers in Germany, France, and the
Netherlands have participated in Payments for Environ-
mental Services (PES), changing their practices in ex-
change for payment (or “subsidy,” depending on your
perspective). PES can be more efficient than regulation in
reducing negative externalities when the transaction
costs of dealing with point sources are low. The World
Wildlife Fund is piloting a program in the Danube basin
in Bulgaria and Romania with financial support from the
European Union (EU) and the United Nations (see
http://tinyurl.com/awra-z1). Besides working directly
with point sources, the World Water Forum (WWF) pro-
ject avoids potential problems with regulators who are in-
capable or unwilling to regulate water quality.
BARRIERS TO MARKETS
The European elephant in the room is a WFD that re-
quires EU countries to monitor and bring water quality
within watersheds up to “good” levels by 2015. The WFD
(see http://tinyurl.com/awra-z2) uses cost-benefit
analysis to determine which pollutants represent the
biggest risks and which technologies are best at reducing
those risks, but it says that  ”all existing technology-dri-
ven source-based controls must be implemented.” Al-
though the WFD emphasizes the importance of polluter
pays and full-cost pricing, the practical application of
mandated “technology-driven source controls” leaves lit-
tle room for implementing a cap and trade system that
meets standards within the watershed by allowing bigger
polluters to use less-than-best practices in exchange for
paying other polluters to implement better practices (see
http://tinyurl.com/awra-z4).
This emphasis on across-the-board best practices
probably reflects a transition from historic directives con-
trolling point source emissions of nitrates, wastewater,
industrial emissions, etc. It may also represent a policy
solution supported by polluters with expensive equip-
ment who did not want their investments rendered un-
competitive by a cap and trade market that would allow
their competitors to meet pollution standards using pur-
chased cheap credits instead of expensive equipment.
From a more pragmatic perspective, it is also easier
to monitor equipment installations and operations than
discharge levels when the quality and quantity of regula-
tors varies, from Greece to Denmark and from Spain to
Lithuania. So it is easier to require that facilities have the
same equipment (inputs) and monitor overall river health
(outputs) without worrying about intermediate emission
details.
Nevertheless, the WFD’s emphasis on point source
standards and best practices that require heavily capital
expenditures is starting to wear thin where people do not
see the value of investing in marginal water quality im-
provements. One of the United Kingdom’s largest water
companies proposes trading in emissions and bulk water
(Severn Trent Water, 2010), arguing that additional cap-
ital spending on raw water sourcing and wastewater
treatment imposes costs on consumers, does nothing to
reduce nonpoint pollution, and increases carbon emis-
sions. Such expenditures can also be wasteful, as when
the “best available” technology cannot be proparly imple-
mented or when regulation targets the wrong version of
“clean.”
Regulatory Efficiency?
Markets tend to be more efficient when transactions
are standardized and separable. Bureaucratic processes
tend to be more efficient when transactions create
spillovers or are difficult to quantify. These tradeoffs also
depend on the skills and ethics of the bureaucrats im-
plementing regulations. The lack of markets in Europe
may therefore reflect a longer history of “subtle” regula-
tion and a greater faith in competent bureaucrats.
Europe has a longer history of human activities and
a higher population density than market-friendly places
like the U.S., Australia, and Chile. Population density in
the Netherlands (No. 30 in the world, according to
Wikipedia) and most of Europe is higher than in the U.S,
(No. 179) or Australia (No. 234). It is easier to use mar-
kets to allocate quantity or quality from one place to an-
other when population density is lower and there are
fewer spillovers affecting other uses.
Now consider the institutions that markets would re-
place. Some Dutch water boards (waterschappen) have
been managing water quality, quantity, and infrastruc-
ture since the 13th Century. Some Spanish irrigators
have depended on tribunals de las aguas (water courts) to
manage local water supplies since the Moorish era (which
ended in 1492) or even earlier. Other countries have sim-
ilar institutions that have delivered results for centuries
and reflect a balance among water uses that may be im-
possible to qualify, quantify, or simplify. They may repre-
sent the most efficient mechanism for managing water,
but – even if they aren’t – it would be difficult to convince
the people who rely on these institutions to switch to
markets that promise efficiency. That said, Spain’s tri-
bunals have been superceded by changing events. It is
easier to add markets in places where single-purpose in-
stitutions (such as irrigation districts) maintain canals
and distribute water. That’s what’s occasionally hap-
pened in the U.S. and more widely in Australia and Chile.
It could also happen in Europe. Finally, we must consid-
er a European “preference” for solutions managed by bu-
16 • Water Resources IMPACT September • 2011
Water Markets in Europe . . . cont’d.
European water markets for quality and quantity
are not well developed ... the main reason is a
European emphasis on bureaucratic water allo-
cation and regulations on water quality
reaucrats with higher status and better qualifications
and status than their equals in the U.S. These stylized
facts mean that there may be two equilibria for allocating
water quality and quantity decisions: markets in places
like the U.S. and Australia and regulators in Europe.
WHERE MARKETS MAY DEVELOP
The relative lack of European water markets does not
mean that they will never appear. Worsening freshwater
scarcity, decreasing returns to WFD regulations, and
growing knowledge of markets elsewhere increase the
probability of more markets in Europe. Let’s consider the
demand and supply for markets.
Demand for markets in quantity will increase where
water is scarce (Figure 1). The supply side will be driven
by changes in land use, additional conveyance or storage
infrastructure, and changes in fees or regulations that
reprioritize uses. Turkey and Russia are relatively water
rich countries on the edge of Europe that have proposed
water exports. Turkey ended talks to sell water to Israel
in June 2010 after Israeli commandoes killed several
Turks on ships carrying “humanitarian aid” (the cargo is
disputed) toward Gaza. Turkey plans to build a pipeline
to (“Turkish”) Northern Cyprus by 2013, but that export
deal is certainly not an arm’s length market transaction.
Russia’s Putin has suggested selling water to other coun-
tries, but he (and his government) are unreliable part-
ners in any long-term transactions.
Demand for markets in quality will come where water
is polluted (Figure 2). Supply will come from changes in
water use, treatment technologies, and new or enforced
regulations that create opportunities to sell quality im-
provements.
CONCLUSION
European water markets for quality or quantity are
not well developed. The main reason is a European em-
phasis on bureaucratic water allocation and regulations
on water quality. These institutions may be relatively ef-
ficient for European conditions, but growing water
scarcity and increasing cost for meeting watershed qual-
ity goals are creating opportunities for markets that can
deliver greater amounts of cleaner water at lower costs.
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Figure 1. Water Exploitation Index in 2000 and 2030.
Source: European Environment Agency (http://tinyurl.com/awra-z5).
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Figure 2. Looming Water Quality Concerns Across Europe.
Source: UNEP (http://tinyurl.com/awra-z6).
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